I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that A, the governor, and B, an individual, entered into an agreement whereby B paid A $2,000,000 in exchange for A exercising his governmental power to appoint B to a top government position. 1 Imagine further that A and B then reduced the agreement to a writing that contains an arbitration provision. Subsequently, A breaches the agreement by failing to appoint B. Thereafter, an arbitrator awards B damages for the breach.
Consider, perhaps, a more likely scenario. Imagine that two individuals A and B get a divorce and a family court orders A to pay B $2,000 per month in alimony. Subsequently, A and B agree that A will pay B $100 in alimony per month, in contravention of the court order, in exchange for A's not informing the court of B's criminal activity. Imagine further that the agreement contains an arbitration clause, B seeks arbitration of the agreement, and an arbitrator finds that the agreement is binding, thus reducing the amount of alimony ordered by the court.
As a matter of ordinary contract law, neither of these contracts is enforceable in any court, as both are illegal and thus violate what is 600
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Vol. XIV FINANCIAL LAW first examining its roots in Lockean social contract theory and then discussing its subsequent development in the arbitration context by the Supreme Court's decisions in Hurd 13 and Grace. 14 Part IV discusses Hall Street Associates, providing a brief historical background of the case and outlining the Court's strict plain-meaning reasoning. Part V discusses the impossibility of harmonizing the FAA with the public policy exception through the use of statutory construction principles, ultimately concluding that Hall Street Associates has displaced the public policy exception. This Part also discusses the negative effects such a displacement has on the fabric of the law as well as courts' social contract duties. Finally, Part VI discusses three proposals to preserve the public policy exception. The first proposal argues that Congress could remedy the problem by simply amending the FAA to include a public policy vacatur prong. This proposal, however, carries two significant drawbacks. Congress, through inaction, has demonstrated a reluctance to amend the FAA. In addition, Congressional action is slow, leaving considerable time for significant damage to the fabric of the law -a consequence already occurring in lower courts. The second proposal argues courts could interpret existing vacatur provisions within the FAA as including a public policy exception. This proposal, however, suffers from a consistency problem. That is, courts have universally held the public policy exception to be a creature of common law. Moreover, changing course in such a dramatic manner gives the appearance of judicial caprice, undermining the public's confidence in the legal system. The last proposal, and the one the author urges courts to adopt, argues the courts should view the public policy exception as an inherent power of the courts, existing irrespective of express Congressional mandate.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE FAA
While arbitration is presently a hot topic in the legal community, 15 arbitration has existed for centuries 16 and has been used as a means of 13. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948) (reaffirming the public policy exception in the context of a restrictive covenant that was racially discriminatory).
14. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757 (1983) (extending the public policy exception to arbitration awards in labor disputes).
15. Much of the current debate centers around whether courts can enforce heightened-standard-of-review clauses. See, e.g., Burton, supra note 5; Eric Chafetz,
The Propriety of Expanded Judicial Review Under the FAA: Achieving a Balance Between Enforcing Parties' Agreements According to Their Terms and Maintaining
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alternative dispute resolution in the United States since the country's inception. 17 Nevertheless, the United States' legal system has only fully embraced the practice in the last eighty years.
Throughout most of this country's existence, the United States judiciary has expressed open hostility to arbitration as a means of conflict resolution. That is, American judges initially reasoned that private parties could not through contract do that which they could not otherwise do: "oust" judicial jurisdiction. 18 In 1926, Congress tackled this hostility to arbitration with the enactment of the FAA.
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A. The Essentials of the FAA
The FAA is a comprehensive statutory structure intended to turn the tide of judicial hostility toward arbitration and place valid arbitration agreements "on the same footing as other contracts."
20 To achieve that end, the FAA informally has three main parts:
21 sections intended to (1854 J. 333, 335 (1995) ; see also Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1984) ("[T] he need for the law arises from . . . the jealousy of the English courts for their own jurisdiction. . . . This jealousy survived for so long a period that the principle became firmly embedded in the English common law and was adopted with it by the American courts.") (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 96, 68th Cong., Sess. 1 (1924)); Maggio & Bales, supra note 15, at 160; Schmitz, supra note 15, 137 (stating American courts viewed arbitration as threatening their power); Stempel, supra note 16, at 273-74. The reservations of American jurists were largely a construct of British courts' reluctance. Although English courts were not initially hostile to arbitration, scholars believe English courts began to disfavor executory arbitration agreements following Lord Coke's discussion of the revocability doctrine in Vynior's Case. Burton, supra note 5, at 473-74; Schmitz, supra note 15, at 137; Sullivan, supra note 15, at 520; see Maggio & Bales, supra note 12, at 160 (stating English jurists believed the arbitration process would undermine judicial power); see also Stempel, supra note 12, at 70 (stating English courts were unwilling to enforce executory arbitration contracts, holding the contracts were void as against public policy). The revocability doctrine presumed that parties could always preserve their right to refuse arbitration and invoke the authority of the courts. Thus, while the courts were willing to enforce arbitration agreements once an arbitrator reached a decision, the courts were unwilling to enforce agreements to arbitrate when one party decided to renege on the arbitration agreement. Schmitz, supra note 15, at 137. Eventually, the revocability doctrine mutated into the ouster doctrine, a doctrine providing that parties cannot, through contract, refuse the jurisdiction of the courts. Id. 19. The FAA was originally named the United States Arbitration Act, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)). For further information on the history of the FAA, see Haydock & Henderon, supra note 17, at 148 n. 35. 20. Hall St. Assocs., v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396 , 1402 ; see also Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006) 25. Section 1 provides definitions for both "maritime transaction" and "commerce." Of the two, obviously, the more commonly used to invoke the Act is the commerce provision. The Act defines "commerce" as:
[C]ommerce among the several States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the United States of in the District of Columbia, or between any such Territory and another, or between any such Territory and any State or foreign nation, or between the District of Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign nation, but nothing herein shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.
Id. § 1.
26. Section 14 of the Act limits its application to contracts occurring after that date. Id. § 14.
27. Id. § 2. While this provision would initially seem to permit general court review of contracts pursuant to common law contractual principles, the United States Supreme Court has held that this provision does not permit judicial review unless the allegation of a common law basis for avoidance inheres to the arbitration clause itself, as opposed to the general provisions of the contract. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 444-46 (2006) . Rather, issues of illegality, fraud, and other methods of common law avoidance must be argued to the arbitrator, unless they inhere to the formation of the contract (e.g. incapacity and authority). Id. Of course, once the arbitrator issues an award, the courts are then only able to review the decision in accordance with 9 U.S.C. sections 10 and 11. Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396 , 1403 ("We hold that § § 10 and 11 respectively provide the FAA's exclusive grounds for vacatur.").
28. Section 3 is a stay provision, providing that a court must stay litigation upon a
604
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The enforcement part -the part most relevant to this discussionincludes sections 9, 10, 11, 12, 34 (1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the motion demonstrating that the matters contained within the litigation are subject to arbitration. 9 U.S.C. § 3.
29. Section 4 is the compulsory provision, providing that courts must compel arbitration pursuant to a valid arbitration agreement. Id. § 4.
30. Section 5 governs appointment of an arbitrator when the parties cannot or have not been able to name one. Id. § 5.
31. Section 6 provides, "Any application to the court hereunder shall be made and heard in the manner provided by law for the making and hearing of motions, except as otherwise herein expressly provided." Id. § 6.
32. Section 7 governs subpoenaing witnesses. 
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III. THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION
The ability to contract has always been subject to limitation.
49
Perhaps the most important of these limitations is the public policy exception, which prohibits courts from enforcing contracts or awards where the contract or award violates the positive law or is more generally against the interest of the public at large.
A. Lockean Social Contract Theory
At least in the United States, 50 the public policy exception ultimately stems from Lockean principles of social contract theory. 50. The public policy exception has existed in other systems of jurisprudence for much longer. See Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. 441, 448 (1874) ("In the Roman law it was declared that 'a promise made to effect a base purpose, as to commit homicide or sacrilege, is not binding.'") (quoting Institutes of Justinian, lib. 3, tit. 19, par. 24) ).
51. See Seymour, 988 F.2d at 1023 (stating the exception derives from the public's interest in having its views represented in the adjudication of private contracts); Randall, supra note 15, at 781 ("[T]he underlying policy for the exception is that federal courts ultimately represent the interests of the public, who would otherwise be unrepresented in the private action before the court."); see also Richard H.W. Maloy, Public Policy -Who Should Make it in America's Oligarchy?, 1998 DET. C.L. REV. 1143 , 1158 (1998 ("[T] he Supreme Court has said that the people, through their constitutions and legislative bodies make public policy.").
52. One could make the same claim about Jean Jacques Rousseau and Thomas Paine, as they also espoused the social contract theory. 56 According to this "social contract" theory, people were originally born within a state of nature, in which every person initially constituted his or her own individual government -choosing his or her own laws of morality, conduct, and punishment.
57 When these individuals began to organize in groups -entered into social contracts -each individual government delegated some of its powers to the organization or the new government.
58 That new government then became a trustee or steward, acting on behalf of the component individuals for their safety and protection. 59 Of course, the new government cannot act for itself and thus found it necessary to democratically appoint officers or servants to act on its behalf, creating 58. Locke, supra note 56, at 764 ("But because no political society can be, nor subsist, without having in itself the power to preserve the property, and, in order thereunto, punish the offences of all those of that society; there and there only is political society, where every one of the members hath quitted his natural power, resigned it up into the hands of the community . . . ."). Absolute sovereignty, of course, remains with the people. See King, supra note 52, at 617. These principles have been expressly adopted by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Kennett v. Chambers, 55 U.S. 38, 11 (1852) ("For as the sovereignty resides in the people, every citizen is a portion of [the government], and is himself personally bound by the laws . . . . The compact is made by the department of the government upon which he himself has agreed to confer the power.").
59. See Locke, supra note 56, at 780 ("The great end of men's entering into society being the enjoyment of their properties in peace and safety . . . ."); Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. 441, 450 (1874) ("The theory of our government is, that all public stations are trusts . . . . No people can have any higher public interest, except the preservation of their liberties, than integrity in the administration of their government in all its departments.").
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laws for the public's protection and then enforcing them. Those laws became the public policy. 60 The public policy exception is thus simply an extension of the government's absolute duty as trustee to act only with the consent of the majority for their individual and collective protection. At its fundamental base, the exception provides that individual parties cannot force the peoples' governmental representatives to exercise social-contract power to enforce agreements prohibited by the majority. 61 Any other action by the government, other than invalidation, would create a paradox: the people would be creating the public policy and simultaneously violating it through governmental representatives. Such an action by the government would necessarily violate the social contract 62 -the great trust the public has placed in the hands of its government and representatives.
B. The Supreme Court's Historical Use of the Public Policy Exception
The Supreme Court has used the public policy exception to invalidate contracts in a variety of contexts, dating back to at least the nineteenth century. For instance, the Court has held that the exception applies where the contract requires an illegal act, 63 compensates a party for procuring a government contract, 64 compensates a party for using personal influence to secure legislation, 65 compensates a party for exercising the power of government appointments, 66 is the vehicle for bribery 60. See Locke, supra note 56, at 781 (stating every person within society is bound by the act of the majority, as that is law, which is necessarily for the public good and the preservation of mankind); see also Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1948) 62. See Locke, supra note 56, at 780 (stating the government is bound by the social contract to dispense justice consistent with the laws of the majority, and no one can "discharge any member of the society from his obedience" to the majority).
63 70 In Hurd, the plaintiffs lived in a community governed by restrictive covenants that prohibited the sale of property to African Americans. Despite these restrictions several owners sold properties to Hurd, an African American.
71
The plaintiffs then sued Hurd in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking injunctive relief on the basis of the covenants. 72 The district court granted the injunction, holding that the deed to Hurd was void because it violated the covenants. 73 The court further enjoined any transfer of covenanted property to African Americans and ordered Hurd to remove himself from the property within sixty days. 74 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether enforcement of the restrictive covenant by a federal court violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
75
Avoiding the constitutional issue, however, the Court held that the restrictive covenant conflicted with the Civil Rights Act 76 and was thus unenforceable. ] ll persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power . . . are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and color, . . . shall have the same right, in every state and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, to be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws . . .") amended by 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006) ("All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law.").
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ground for reversal, the Court summarily held, as a general matter, that courts are obligated to deny enforcement of private agreements when enforcement would violate public policy.
78
While the ruling in Hurd was nothing new and, in fact, simply reaffirmed well-worn principles, the opinion quickly became a watermark because of the manner in which the Court subsequently applied those principles. Following Hurd, the federal courts began using the public policy exception on a much more frequent basis.
79
C. Grace and the Development of the Public Policy Exception in the Context of Labor Arbitrations
The frequent use of the public policy exception eventually expanded jurisprudentially when, in W.R. Grace & Company, 80 the Supreme Court began using the exception in the context of arbitrations. In Grace, the Grace Company entered into a collective bargaining agreement with a local union (the "Union"). 81 Then, in response to a lawsuit for violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 82 Grace entered into a conciliation agreement 83 with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("the EEOC"), 84 the substantive provisions of which were inconsistent with the collective bargaining agreement.
In a subsequent lawsuit brought by the Union, the district court ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of Grace, holding that the conciliation agreement was superior to the collective bargaining agreement, and thus, the collective bargaining agreement could be modified so as to comply with the Civil Rights Act. 85 The Union then appealed to 86 While the appeal was pending, Grace laid off employees consistent with the district court order but in violation of the collective bargaining agreement.
87
The fifth circuit reversed, 88 and the grievances proceeded to arbitration. 89 Throughout the arbitration proceedings, Grace admitted it had terminated employees during the pending appeal.
90 Nevertheless, Grace argued the arbitrators could not find a breach of the collective bargaining agreement because Grace was acting consistently with the district court's order. 91 The arbitrator disagreed with Grace, finding Grace's conduct, while consistent with the district court's order, was nonetheless in breach of the collective bargaining agreement. 92 Grace then moved to prevent enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement for the period of time when the original appeal was pending before the fifth circuit. 93 The district court agreed and issued an order to that effect.
94
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that courts are obligated not to enforce agreements conflicting with public policy. 95 Further, the Court created the framework for evaluating contracts under the public policy exception. Specifically, to be unenforceable by a court, the public policy must be "well defined and dominant, and . . . [must be] ascertained by 'reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.'" 96 Nevertheless, the Court held that no such prohibition existed in Grace, as Grace created its own impossible predicament. 97 That is, Grace generated the situation wherein it had to choose between the court's order and the collective bargaining agreement. Thus, Grace could not then use that conflict as a basis to avoid its contractual duties. 
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Under the FAA Significant differences undeniably exist between arbitrations of collective bargaining agreements and arbitrations conducted pursuant to the FAA. 99 Nevertheless, the federal courts began using the public policy exception as an extra-statutory basis for vacatur under the FAA, 100 reasoning the public policy exception was inherent in all contracts, and arbitrations were essentially dispute mechanisms generated by contract. Specifically, the circuits generated essentially three different forms of public policy exceptions: illegality, award, and pure policy. Whoever knowingly transports any individual in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, with intent that such individual engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.
Id. See also 18 U.S.C.S. § 371 (2006):
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years or both.
Id.
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under the FAA.
104
The award public policy form arises where the contract itself does not have an illegal object or purpose, but the arbitrator's award nevertheless violates constitutional or statutory prohibitions. 105 Thus, for example, imagine that A owns a large hotel that serves multi-state and multi-national clientele, and B rents a room 106 through an online travel service. Imagine further that the contract between A and B includes an arbitration clause. Several weeks later, B attempts to check-in to the hotel. However, A denies B entry into the hotel on the basis that B is an African American. B then seeks arbitration of the dispute. During the arbitration, the arbitrator finds that A did not breach the agreement by denying B admission on the basis of B's racial status. The arbitrator further enjoins B from entering the premises. While the contract itself is legal (as it is simply a contract between a hotel and a customer), the award is not, because it violates the Civil Rights Act, 107 112 but can also surface in other contexts as well. Furthermore, these almost always arise in situations where the contract or award endangers the safety of the public. For example, imagine A owns a company that generates dangerous chemicals, and B owns a company that ships those chemicals across the country. Imagine further that A and B reach an agreement whereby B will ship A's chemicals, but A must relieve B of all future liability, including liability arising from intentional torts.
113 Of course, the agreement contains an arbitration provision. Several months after the execution of the agreement, A and B have a disagreement over payment provisions of the contract and, as revenge, B intentionally dumps a container of chemicals on A's property. B then terminates the contract and A seeks arbitration. At the arbitration hearing, the arbitrator finds that B breached the contract by terminating it. Nevertheless, the arbitrator finds that B was not liable for intentionally dumping the chemicals, as the contract specifically limited B's liability for intentional torts.
This situation is different from the prostitution ring example 114 in that neither the contract nor the award affirmatively violates the positive law. But the award violates the social contract or the public policy of protecting the public. 
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IV. HALL STREET ASSOCIATES AND THE SHIFT TOWARDS EXCLUSIVITY UNDER THE FAA
While the above forms were certainly the norm prior to Hall Street Associates, the Supreme Court -either intentionally or negligently -has compromised their continued existence.
As the number of arbitrations under the FAA grew, parties began altering its substantive provisions through contract. Specifically, parties began contracting for vacatur standards that did not exist within section 10 of the Act. This movement eventually percolated into the court system through the confirmation procedures outlined in section 9. After conducting the arbitration in accordance with the contract, parties began seeking judicial review under the heightened review standards. The circuit courts then split on whether such provisions were enforceable. 116 All this created the backdrop for Hall Street Associates.
In this case, Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. ("Hall Street") entered into a contract with Mattel, Inc. ("Mattel"), whereby Hall Street agreed to lease a manufacturing site to Mattel. 117 The lease included a predecessor indemnification clause, requiring that Mattel indemnify Hall Street for fines, fees, or costs associated with violation of environmental laws by Mattel's predecessors.
118
Mattel terminated the lease, however, when it learned that the property was contaminated.
119 Hall Street then sued Mattel, alleging Mattel breached the lease by terminating it and by refusing to pay the
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cleanup costs of the environmental contamination. 120 The parties subsequently agreed to submit the cleanup issue to arbitration, which was approved and incorporated into a court order. 121 The resulting arbitration agreement contained a provision regarding expanded judicial review. Specifically, the agreement provided: "The Court shall vacate, modify or correct any award: (i) where the arbitrator's findings of facts are not supported by substantial evidence, or (ii) where the arbitrator's conclusions of law are erroneous."
122
The arbitrator ultimately concluded no indemnification was due under the lease "because the lease obligation to follow all applicable federal, state, and local environmental laws did not require compliance with the testing requirements of the Oregon Drinking Water Quality Act . . . ."
123 Hall Street then moved to vacate the arbitration award, arguing that the arbitrator committed legal error by ignoring the Oregon Drinking Water Quality Act. 124 The district court granted the motion, holding the arbitrator committed legal error and the court could grant vacatur on that ground because the parties had so contracted. The district court then remanded the matter to the arbitrator. 125 On remand, the arbitrator found in favor of Hall Street. 126 On further appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding the FAA does not permit parties to contract for standards of review divergent from those included within 9 U.S.C. § 10.
127
The United States Supreme Court thereafter granted certiorari to determine whether the FAA permits parties to contract for standards of re- Between the ninth circuit's initial review and the Supreme Court's ultimate review, the case took additional procedural turns. After the ninth circuit reversed the district court here, it remanded the case to reconsider the motion for confirmation using only the standards within the FAA. Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 113 Fed. Appx. 272, 273 (9th. Cir. 2004 ). Subsequently, on remand, the district court again granted the motion to vacate, holding the arbitrator's award was an "implausible" interpretation of the contract, and thus, the arbitrator exceeded his power's under 9 U.S.C. § 10(4). On appeal, the ninth circuit again reversed, holding that implausibility is not a ground for vacatur pursuant to the FAA. Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 196 Fed. Appx. 476, 477 (9th Cir. 2006 ).
620
FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE &
Vol. XIV FINANCIAL LAW view beyond those provided within section 10. The Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit that the FAA does not permit heightened vacatur standards, explaining that the plain meaning of the text compelled the Court to view the provisions of sections 10 and 11 as exclusive.
128
In its decision, the Court focused on the words "must grant" found in section 9, which provides that upon application by any party to confirm an arbitration award, a court "must grant such an [award] 132. The "manifest disregard" standard is a judicially created exception intended to prevent knowing and/or intentional violations of the law. See, e.g., Westerbecke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co., 304 F.3d 200, 217 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that an arbitrator manifestly disregards the law when "the arbitrator kn[ows] of the relevant principle, appreciate [s] that this principle controlled the outcome of the disputed issue, and nonetheless willfully flout[s] the governing law by refusing to apply it"). While public policy violations and manifest disregard violations could certainly overlap where an arbitrator knowingly and/or intentionally violated positive law, the two are not the same. For instance, a public policy violation can exist even when the arbitrator is unaware of positive law, whereas a manifest disregard violation cannot exist unless the arbitrator is aware of the positive law but nonetheless ignores it. Id. Furthermore, the two are nearly universally treated as separate doctrines. See, e.g Maybe the term "manifest disregard" was meant to name a new ground for review, but maybe it merely referred to the § 10 grounds collectively, rather than adding to them. Or, as some courts have thought, "manifest disregard" may have been shorthand for § 10(a)(3) or § 10(a)(4), the subsections authorizing vacatur when the arbitrators were "guilty of misconduct" or "exceeded their powers."
134 Second, Hall Street argued parties should be able to expand judicial review because the FAA explicitly favors the freedom to contract. The Court again disagreed, referring to its plain meaning analysis. [requires] more than error or misunderstanding with respect to the law. The error must have been obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator.").
133. Hall St. Assocs., 128 S. Ct. at 1403. 134. Id. at 1404 (internal citations omitted). 135. Justice Scalia joined in the opinion of the Court with the exception of one footnote regarding legislative history. Id. at 1400 n.1. Both Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer dissented. Id. at 1408-10. Justice Stevens's dissent argues that the majority's decision conflicts with the primary purpose of the FAA, as the intent of Congress in creating the FAA was to place agreements to arbitrate on the same footing as other contracts. Thus, Justice Stevens argues that Congressional intent is best served by permitting parties to alter the vacatur provisions through contract. Id. Justice Breyer's dissent also revolves around the principal purpose of the FAA, which he contends was to shield arbitration agreements from judicial pens rather than to prevent the creative pens of parties. Consequently, Justice Breyer opines, parties' alteration of the vacatur provi-
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In sum, Hall Street Associates is perhaps best characterized as a silent bang, as few courts have analyzed the decision because it relates to non-statutory review mechanisms. Those courts that have examined the decision, however, have reached inconsistent conclusions regarding its effect on the public policy exception. For instance, at least one court is cautiously optimistic that the public policy exception was untouched by the Court in Hall Street Associates, explaining that if one assumes the public policy exception is an outgrowth of the contractual powers ground, 136 then the exception survived. 137 Other courts have discussed the public policy exception, but have not mentioned whether Hall Street Associates would have any effect on the exception.
138
Notwithstanding the judicial discussions above, none of the courts that reviewed this issue have evaluated the exception's continued vitality -or lack thereof -using anything other than conclusory analysis. More importantly, no other court has used what the Supreme Court would presumably use: statutory construction principles. 140 While none of the courts discussing Hall Street Associates have specifically ruled on whether the public policy exception has survived the opinion, application of basic statutory construction principles indicates the public policy exception has not survived post-Hall.
The provisions of the FAA aside, a statute cannot abrogate a constitutional provision.
141 Rather, only a constitutional amendment can abrogate or modify constitutional provisions.
142 Consequently, if the FAA, as a result of an arbitrator's award, invites a court to engage in an unconstitutional act, the court must decline.
143
In the absence of a constitutional conflict, the situation becomes more complicated. Pursuant to basic statutory construction principles, when two statutes are inconsistent, typically the courts will initially attempt to harmonize them. 144 For instance, imagine two parties, A and 143. For instance, if the Hurd circumstances were repeated and the case was arbitrated, courts could avoid enforcement of the award -not on the basis of the public policy exception, but rather on the basis that the FAA could not force a court to engage in an unconstitutional act.
144. See, e.g., Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1024 (1984 Imagine further that A and B execute a written agreement to that effect, which contains an arbitration agreement invoking the FAA. Subsequently, A breaches the agreement and, pursuant to the arbitration provision, A and B arbitrate the dispute. Thereafter, the arbitrator issues an award in favor of B and A moves to vacate the award. Should a court confirm the award?
First, the agreement itself is illegal because it violates federal statutory law. 146 The only remaining analysis, therefore, is whether the FAA nonetheless requires confirmation. Initially, illegality is not a ground contained within sections 10 and 11 as the courts have thus far interpreted those sections.
147 Furthermore, the example does not indicate any statutory basis for vacatur under the FAA. Thus, the court must decide two things: do the FAA and the criminal prohibition conflict with each other and, if so, can the two be harmonized?
Even assuming these statutes conflict, they can indeed be harmonized. When two statutes allegedly conflict, the court should always construe them so as to give each the fullest possible effect. 148 In this light, the two statutes appear compatible: one merely requires arbitration in certain circumstances, while the other prohibits price fixing. Consequently, the statutes can co-exist. The law criminally punishes those who either engage in price fixing or conspire to do so, but if a party does engage in such conduct under an agreement that includes an arbitration clause, the dispute will be handled by arbitration, at least for its civil component.
meaning.").
145. This example is loosely based on United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 340 U. S. 76 (1950) , and Hammes v. AAMCO Transmission, Inc., 33 F.3d 774, 783 (7th Cir. 1994 Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 530-32 (1998) . This principle provides no relief, however, as the vacatur provisions of the FAA are the more specific principles in this instance. For this argument to prevail in the example above, the price-fixing prohibition would need a provision specifically 150 a court will not enforce a contract that is against public policy or, in this circumstance, illegal.
151 While reason would dictate that Hurd's directives must survive after Hall Street Associates, that view misses a crucial point. Hurd's premise -at least insofar as the Court stated it in that case and has since permitted it to evolve in the context of arbitration jurisprudence -derives from a common law rule. As between a statute and a common law rule, the statute prevails.
152
Consequently, Hall Street Associates' exclusivity language demonstrates that the public policy exception has withered on the vine.
VI. THE COURT'S ELIMINATION OF THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION CREATES UNDESIRABLE RESULTS
The Court's elimination of the public policy exception creates undesirable results, as it undermines both: (a) the judiciary's social contract duties, thereby endangering the public, and (b) the public's faith in the judiciary.
A. Undermining of the Judiciary's Social Contract Duties
The heart of the social contract is that the government exists for and at the will of the majority. Designed as a protector, the government is essentially a large, resourceful guardian, capable of protecting its individual parts and laws.
154 If this were not so, government would cease to prohibiting the enforcement of such an agreement in an arbitration setting. 150. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948 ) 151. See id. at 34-35. 152. See United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993 ("Congress need not affirmatively proscribe the common-law . . . . [C]ourts may take it as a given that Congress has legislated with an expectation that the [common law] principle will apply except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.") (internal quotations omitted); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U. S. 304, 312-14 (1981) (stating that when Congress enacts a statute on a subject matter previously governed by the common law, the statute controls).
153. While this discussion only specifically referenced the first form, analysis of the second form would follow the same path. Furthermore, analysis of the third form would not even survive initial scrutiny, as statutory construction principles are unnecessary when statutes conflict with the common law. 154. See Locke, supra note 56, at 780 ("The great end of men's entering into society being the enjoyment of their properties in peace and safety . . . .").
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serve a function.
155 Thus, the elimination of the public policy exception, in any of its various forms, is troubling as it would require the judiciary, at least in some circumstances, to violate its duties under the social contract.
Illegality and Award Forms
Removing the illegality 156 and award forms 157 undermines the judiciary's social contract duty to enforce the laws of the majority as written; without these forms, the judiciary must permit maverick arbitration awards despite their illegality.
As stated earlier, the public policy exception is an outgrowth of Lockean social contract doctrines. Locke's central theme was that the government should serve as an unbiased umpire to carry out the will of the majority and to resolve disputes in a fair manner.
158 Inherent in and integral to that duty are the notions that every person is bound by the will of the majority, 159 that no one can "discharge any member of the society from his obedience" to the majority, 160 and that the government is bound to dispense justice consistent with the positive law.
161
In this context, the judiciary's enforcement of illegal arbitration awards violates the founding principles, because a contract or award that violates positive law (a criminal prohibition) is by definition against the will of the majority. Thus, the judiciary is duty-bound to avoid the ratification and enforcement of such an award.
Arguably, the will of the majority is served by strictly following the mandates of the FAA's vacatur provisions. 162 Congress, the body acting on behalf of the majority, explicitly stated its will by narrowly defining the circumstances under which it believed vacatur would be reasonable. 158. Locke, supra note 56, at 764-65 ("And thus all private judgment of every particular member being excluded, the community comes to be umpire, by settled standing rules, indifferent, and the same to all parties; and by men having authority from the community, for the execution of those rules . . . .").
159. This position, however, overlooks the fact that Congress also prohibited the criminal conduct -also a statement of the majority's willand a court's enforcement of such a provision assists the parties to engage in behavior that the public has decided is, at best, undesirable. The question, therefore, becomes one of choice. Which violation is more sinister to the principles of the social contract -violating the provisions of the FAA by vacating an award on a ground not permitted therein or assisting the parties in conduct the majority has prohibited as criminal? Given that the chief goal of government is to protect persons and property, coupled with the fact that criminally prohibited actions are more dangerous than violations of the FAA, 163 this seems to be an easy choice.
Pure Policy Form
Removing the pure policy form 164 forces the judiciary to violate its inherent social-contract duty to protect the public. 165 As stated earlier, the ultimate duty of government is to protect its individual members.
166
The waning of the pure policy form substantially undermines this principle, as its absence requires the judiciary to ratify arbitration awards that are potentially dangerous to the public.
Critics of the pure policy form have three main objections. First, critics argue that no award could simultaneously violate public policy and fall short of violating positive law.
167 Second, even assuming such an award could exist, critics believe that preserving the court's ability to fashion a remedy for such an event would lead to confusion and un- Finally, critics hold that the public policy form permits courts a "fast and loose" method of vacating awards with which a court simply disagrees.
169
None of these objections, however, withstands scrutiny. Technology and society are always changing and with those changes come concomitant modifications in the positive law. But the evolution of the positive law is inherently much slower than the change that drives it. Thus, a significant time lag exists between the entrance of innovations into the mainstream and the development of the respective positive law.
While plenty of examples are certainly available, this premise is so basic that it does not warrant extended discussion. Indeed, the concept that positive law, including the Constitution itself, is living and breathing has become a common feature of jurisprudence.
170 Moreover, to the extent maverick arbitrators would be the exception and not the rule, that premise is unsettling; presumably, the entire appellate court structure exists, at least in part, to control unruly or simply incorrect decisions by the inferior courts. More importantly, assuming maverick arbitrators are indeed rare, even one lone arbitrator could still seriously endanger the safety and welfare of the public.
171
As to the second criticism, the question is whether the confusion and uncertainty is a price worth paying. The answer is inevitably yes, particularly when the alternative is to leave the courts unable to protect the public against danger; such a position is irresponsible and violates the court's social-contract duty, as stewards of the government, to protect the public. 172 Finally, while many critics believe that the exception opens the door to judicial review of awards on the merits, the numbers simply do not pan out. 
B. Undermining Public Confidence
Removal of the public policy exception will also undermine the public's confidence in the judiciary. The judiciary is considered the ultimate arbiter of justice -blind to emotion, above reproach, and completely unbiased. 174 Forcing the courts to ignore their social-contract duties is bound to tarnish their image.
For example, imagine that the public learns that a court was aware of an arbitration award endangering the public but nonetheless refused to exercise its social contract power to deny it. The reputations of that court and of the broader legal system are likely to suffer.
The same can be said of the court's enforcement of an illegal contract. Referring again to the price-fixing example, 175 imagine the public learns of the court's enforcement of that contract. Aiding and abetting criminal behavior is illegal, but it is unlikely that the courts would be charged with violating the law for confirming the award, notwithstanding the social-contract inconsistency.
176 Thus, the perception becomes, "the law applies to everyone except the courts."
While courts frequently make unpopular decisions that evoke the public ire, the potential for severe criticism here is even more damaging.
173. Hodges, supra note 15, at 95 ("A study of cases challenging arbitration awards between 1960 and 1988 found 73 cases in which the public policy argument was the primary claim.") (citing Peter Feuille & Michael LeRoy, Grievance Arbitration Appeals in the Federal Courts: Facts and Figures, 45 ARB. J. 35, 44 (1990) ); Goldman, supra note 15, at 181 (stating challenges to awards on this ground are rarely successful); see also Burton, supra note 5, at 482 ("In practice, courts vacate few arbitral awards.").
174. See Martha J. Dragich, Justice Blackmun, Franz Kafka, and Capital Punishment, 63 MO. L. REV. 853, 905 (1998) ("We expect that many decisions are difficult -even agonizing -but in order to maintain our confidence in the courts, we expect judges to carry out dispassionately the duties we have entrusted to them. . . . We do not expect to read in opinions the judge's personal views -in fact, we expect judges, as unbiased arbiters, to set personal beliefs aside."); see also 
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Unpopular decisions on the basis of substantive merit quite often have survived within the system, with the judiciary ultimately maintaining some modicum of respect based on the presumption that, while the particular result is not perhaps agreeable to the public, the court was attempting to protect the fabric of the law. In this case, however, the court would not be protecting the public or the fabric of the law. Rather, the court would be deciding to simply protect private parties to a contract, perhaps even at the majority's expense.
VII. PROPOSALS
There are three potential remedies that may resolve this problem. Congress could amend the FAA to include the public policy exception. Alternatively, courts could construe the public policy exception as being part and parcel to the contractual powers prong 177 of the vacatur provisions. Lastly, courts could construe the public policy exception as an inherent power of the judiciary, existing beyond the reach of Congressional limitation. This Part will discuss each of these potential remedies in turn below.
A. Congress could amend the FAA to include the Public Policy Exception
While it is certainly true that most state statutes do not include a public policy exception, 178 the notion of a statutory exception is not a novel one. For example, the exception exists within the New York Convention, 179 the French New Code of Civil Procedure, 180 and was considered during the drafting of the Uniform Arbitration Ac A").
181
Furthermore, the mere absence of such statutory mechanisms in the state systems does not alone support a strong argument that such a provision should not exist; after all, state statutes are premised upon the UAA -a uniform act that declines to adopt the exception. Alternatively, an equally likely reason that such provisions are absent is that most st ts believe the exception applies as a common law mechanism.
182
In addition to maintaining the status quo in terms of the FAA's goals, 183 this proposal carries the added benefit of not requiring the judiciary to "turn tail" on its former interpretations of contractual po
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189
The disadvantage of this proposal, of course, is that even assuming Congress was inclined to adopt such a provision, 184 Congressional action is "slow and irresolute,"
185 leaving a substantial amount of time for significant damage to the fabric of the law. Indeed, damage is already beginning to occur in the lower courts. 186 An additional criticism worth noting exists within the comments of the UAA itself. As stated earlier, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ultimately rejected a public policy exception within the UAA, reasoning that, among other things, drafting a bright-line rule would be difficult. 187 Nevertheless, Congress could state the exception summarily. For instance, the exception could be simply added to section 10, and could read: "(5) where the underlying contract or the award violated public policy." This would leave the courts free to interpret what precisely constitutes a violation of public policy, a feat the Supreme Court has already accomplished with some certainty in Grace.
188 Furthermore, to the extent critics would argue that an express exception would open the floodgates to merit-based-searching review of arbitration awards, such concerns have remained in utero for the past half century, as public policy violations are rarely litigated and even
